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Letter to the Editor
The probability of association between
response inhibition and compulsive
symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder:
Response to Abramovitch and Abramowitz
To the Editors:
Abramovitch and Abramowitz (2014) listed several problems
with the conclusions they interpret as having been drawn from
cross-sectional (correlational) data in our recent article (Harsányi
et al., 2014). First of all, causal inferences such as response
inhibition deﬁcits underlying compulsive rituals cannot logically
be concluded from correlational data. However, this conclusion
was never drawn in our article.
Contrary to what Abramovitch and Abramowitz state in their
Letter to the Editors, we did not conclude that response inhibition
leads to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD); rather, we reported
that inhibition deﬁcit can be observed in OCD. We, of course, share
the opinion of Abramovitch and Abramowitz that extensive
deﬁcits of executive functions, including response inhibition, are
identiﬁable in several other psychiatric illnesses (e.g., in schizo-
phrenia, bipolar affective disorder, attention deﬁcit/hyperactivity
disorder, anxiety disorders, and depression). We described corre-
lations in our article based on the results of our research. However,
we would like to emphasize the fact that in the case of the 51 OCD
patients, we not only used questionnaires measuring executive
functions (DEX, WBSI), but we also used a well-validated neuro-
cognitive test battery to assess these functions.
Abramovitch and Abramowitz question whether the Dysexe-
cutive Questionnaire (DEX) adequately measures executive deﬁ-
cits. They base their skepticism on a study by Chaytor et al. (2006)
in which the correlation of the DEX with executive tests was not
particularly high.
In reference, we would like to highlight that the study by
Chaytor et al. (2006) is grounded on the data of a group of merely
46 patients, with a variety of neurological disorders, where
correlation was carried out with a few tests measuring executive
performance and experimental methods (Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST), Trail Making Test, Stroop Color and Word Test,
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT)), and between
the DEX and other questionnaires. This study found a moderate
correlation between the DEX and the Stroop task (r¼0.35) and
weak or no correlation between the DEX and the Trail Making
Test-Part B, COWAT and WCST (r¼0.25, r¼0.28, r¼0.03,
respectively).
In our opinion, the biggest problemwith this study is that it did
not ﬁnd a substantially stronger correlation between the other
executive tests either. For example, the WCST shows an r¼0.34
correlation with the Trail Making Test-Part B, and an r¼0.33 and
r¼0.00 correlation with the Stroop interference scores. Does this
mean that the WCTS is also an inadequate tool for measuring
executive deﬁcit?
Wilson et al. (1996) and Burgess et al. (1998), in contrast with
Chaytor et al. (2006), when standardizing the DEX, examined 92
patients with brain injuries (closed head injuries, encephalitis,
dementia, stroke) and compared data from the DEX with one of
the most comprehensive neuropsychological test batteries
(Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS)),
consisting of six sub-tests. Research data showed a strong
correlation between the BADS total score and DEX other ratings
(r¼0.62).
The above-cited studies indicate that we can, indeed, regard
the DEX score of signiﬁcant other ratings as a reliable research
tool. Since the manual of the DEX/BADS presents inclusive statis-
tics of dysexecutive symptoms of frontal lobe brain injury patients,
the sentence in our publication, namely that ‘Based on the
normative scales of the DEX questionnaire the presence and
severity of executive problems of our 51 OCD patients were
between 31 and 53 percentile, which shows a severe executive
impairment comparing to the normal control of the manual of the
DEX,’ needs to be more accurate.
In the DEX/BADS manual, the percentage values are not
representative of normal persons but of brain injury patients.
Therefore, the fact that the executive function disorders in our
examined OCD patients fell between 25 and 50 percent provides
an even stronger basis for the presence of ‘severe executive
impairment’, as it stands on a comparable level with the ‘severe’
extent of injury level reﬂecting executive deﬁcit in brain injury
patients. However, we did make an ambiguous statement in our
article, but owing to the standardization logic of the DEX, the 25–
50 percent value in our examined OCD group (based on the data of
a group of patients with brain injuries showing severe executive
deﬁcit) qualiﬁes in the severely impaired range. Nonetheless, we
can also assert, based on clinical data of our examined sample of
patients, that DEX values correlated well with inhibition markers
in the conducted executive tests measuring attentional focus and
switching skills.
To summarize, in our opinion, it is far from clear that the DEX is
an unreliable neuropsychological tool, based both on literature
and our own data. The neuropsychological tasks used to examine
executive functions in our research conﬁrm that scores of the DEX
other ratings are capable of describing executive deﬁcit and
provide an ecologically valid measurement.
Regarding OCD and impulsivity, on the one hand, we are of a
similar opinion as Abramovitch and Abramowitz in that compul-
sions are ‘carefully planned and executed, and are usually carefully
timed in response to obsessions.’ At the same time, we disagree
with their assertion based on clinical observations that ‘…in
clinical work with patients, it is easy to observe that individuals
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with OCD are able to postpone or stop their rituals in certain
circumstances (e.g., to avoid embarrassment, as part of behavior
therapy), which indicates intact ability to inhibit these behaviors.’
We hold that this clinical observation is also present in addictive
behavior patterns (e.g., compulsive gambling) and in substance
dependent addictive patterns (e.g., alcohol dependence) that
essentially reﬂect disorders in impulse control, since in these
clinical patterns patients are also able to suspend their impulsive
behavior under humiliating circumstances. Furthermore, clinical
tests verify the prevalence of impulsivity in OCD, as was recently
reported in patients with OCD, with eating disorder (ED), and
normal controls (Boisseau et al., 2012). They examined values of
impulsivity and ‘response inhibition’ measured by cognitive tests
on the above sample and found that ‘Compared to controls, both
clinical groups reported higher levels of impulsivity on the BIS-11
(Barratt Impulsivity Scale)[but] only the OCD demonstrated
increased stop-signal reaction time. Heightened levels of self-
reported impulsivity may reﬂect the experience of anxiety in both
OCD and ED populations whereas a lack of inhibitory control may
represent a speciﬁc behavioral deﬁcit in OCD’ (Boisseau et al.,
2012).
Altogether, we wished to respond through the above remarks
to the Letter to the Editors by Abramovitch and Abramowitz, but at
the same time, we are delighted they have started a fruitful debate
in these pages with their observations, which we hope will
contribute to an increasingly accurate description of cognitive
disorders accompanying OCD symptoms.
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